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E.P. V. ALASKA PSYCHIATRIC 
INSTITUTE: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL 




The Alaska Statutes require the State to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that an individual is either gravely disabled or a 
danger to himself or others before that person can be involuntarily 
civilly committed. If a person is gravely disabled, the State must also 
prove that his condition will improve with treatment during the 
commitment. There is no such requirement for those who are a 
danger to others, but there is controversy over whether a showing of 
improvement is required for those who are a danger to themselves. In 
E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, E.P. was involuntarily 
committed because he was addicted to huffing gasoline, and the 
courts found that this condition made him a danger to himself. E.P. 
was wrongfully committed for three reasons. First, he was more 
likely gravely disabled than a danger to himself; however, he could 
not be committed for being gravely disabled because the State could 
not show that his condition would improve with treatment. Second, 
the State did not meet its burden of proving that E.P. was a danger 
to himself. Third, even if E.P. was a danger to himself, the Alaska 
Statutes require the State to show that he would improve with 
treatment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Terry Foucha was charged with aggravated battery inside of an 
inhabited dwelling and illegal discharge of a .357 revolver.1 Foucha was 
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found not guilty by reason of insanity and was admitted to a hospital 
because he was found to be a menace to himself and others.2 While at 
the hospital, he remained “combative, agitated, and psychotic” and 
continued to be a “menace to society.”3 Foucha frequently fought with 
other patients and consequently was sent to the maximum security 
section of the hospital.4 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United 
States found his commitment unconstitutional because the State of 
Louisiana failed to meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing 
evidence that Foucha was a danger.5 
In stark contrast, E.P. was involuntarily committed to the Alaska 
Psychiatric Institute (API) for ten months on the grounds that he was 
mentally ill and was considered a danger to himself.6 Unlike Foucha, 
E.P. was never charged with a crime and did not get into altercations at 
the hospital.7 E.P. was involuntarily committed because he was addicted 
to huffing (or inhaling) substances like gasoline fumes.8 Although E.P.’s 
addiction was cited as the reason for his commitment, E.P. did not 
receive any treatment for his addiction while he was locked in API 
because API is not a substance abuse treatment facility.9 Nevertheless, 
the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the commitment and agreed with the 
superior court’s finding that E.P. was a danger to himself.10 
Mental hospitals provide treatment and medication for thousands 
of mentally ill individuals across the nation and are effective for many 
patients. However, the denial of liberty that results from an involuntary 
commitment to a mental hospital has substantial negative effects on a 
person’s physical, social, and mental well-being.11 People who are 
committed to psychiatric hospitals also face social consequences, which 
makes it harder for them to fit in amongst peers and to find jobs post-
commitment.12 Despite the negative aspects of involuntary 
hospitalization, mental hospitals are useful to society when they provide 
 
 1. State v. Foucha, 563 So. 2d 1138, 1138–39 (La. 1990). 
 2. Id. at 1139. 
 3. Id. at 1141 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992). 
 6. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1103–06 (Alaska 2009). 
 7. Id. at 1104. 
 8. Id. at 1104–06. 
 9.    Id. 
 10.  Id. at 1112. 
 11. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 
301–02 (2d ed. 1997). 
 12. Beth E. Molnar, Juveniles and Psychiatric Institutionalization: Toward Better 
Due Process and Treatment Review in the United States, 2 HEALTH & HUMAN RIGHTS 
98, 107–08 (1997). 
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treatment for the mentally ill. However, when an individual confined in 
a mental hospital does not receive treatment for his illness, the hospital 
no longer serves its purpose and becomes merely a prison. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court of the United States 
“repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose 
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection.”13 When deciding whether a commitment is necessary, 
courts must weigh the potential harms to the individual, including the 
denial of constitutional rights, against the state’s interest in providing 
treatment to the individual and preventing future harm to the 
individual and to society.14 Because such important individual rights are 
at stake, the Supreme Court has held that the state bears the burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the commitment is 
necessary.15 
In the Alaska Statute sections that governed E.P.’s case, the Alaska 
Legislature codified the Supreme Court’s recognition that involuntary 
commitments should be used primarily for treatment.16 In Alaska, there 
are three groups of mentally ill individuals who can be committed: those 
who are gravely disabled, those who are a danger to themselves, and 
those who are a danger to others.17 The statute clearly mandates that the 
State can commit a gravely disabled person only when he will improve 
with treatment.18 But, this requirement is not present when a person is a 
danger to others19 because other citizens’ safety concerns are at stake. 
However, an important issue in this case, which will be discussed at 
 
 13. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 
406 U.S. 715 (1972) (Indiana state law allowing pretrial commitment under 
lenient conditions of criminal defendants incompetent to stand trial violated due 
process); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (renewal of involuntary 
commitment under Wisconsin state law required at least an evidentiary 
hearing); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (Arizona court decision to suspend notice 
of a juvenile delinquency and detention hearing violated due process, despite 
the fact that its stated purpose was to “shield the child from public stigma”); 
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (Colorado Sex Offenders Act violated 
due process because it allowed imposition of indeterminate sentence lengths 
without a hearing)). In Addington the Court noted that since the preponderance 
standard results in a “risk of increasing the number of individuals erroneously 
committed,” the interests of the State of Texas were questionable when that 
standard was employed for involuntary commitment. Id. at 426. 
 14. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 432–33. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655 (2010). For example, section 47.30.655(2) of 
the Alaska Statutes states “that persons be treated in the least restrictive 
alternative environment consistent with their treatment needs.” § 47.30.655(2). 
 17. See § 47.30.730(a)(1). 
 18. See § 47.30.730(a)(3). 
 19. See § 47.30.730. 
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length in Part IV.C, is whether the State is required to show that an 
individual will improve with treatment when that individual is 
committed for being a danger to himself. 
In E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,20 the Alaska Supreme Court 
wrongly upheld E.P.’s commitment because the State failed to prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that E.P.’s commitment was necessary. 
First, E.P. was more likely gravely disabled than a danger to himself, so 
the State should have been required to show that he would improve 
with treatment. The State itself admitted that it could not commit E.P. 
for being gravely disabled because he would not improve with 
treatment.21 The State therefore attempted to commit E.P. on the basis 
that he was a danger to himself.22 Second, because the evidence more 
clearly supported the assertion that E.P. was gravely disabled, the State 
did not meet its burden of showing that E.P. was a danger to himself 
with clear and convincing evidence. Third, even if E.P. was a danger to 
himself, the statute required that the State show that E.P. would 
improve with treatment,23 and the State failed to do so. For these 
reasons, E.P.’s involuntary commitment was an unconstitutional 
deprivation of his rights and served more as a punishment than as a 
form of treatment. 
Part I more thoroughly examines the facts of E.P. v. Alaska 
Psychiatric Institute24 (“E.P. v. API”) and the sections of the Alaska 
Statutes that apply to involuntary civil commitments. Part II describes 
the Alaska Supreme Court’s holdings in E.P. v. API. Part III explores the 
legal background of involuntary civil commitments with a focus on the 
standard of proof and the difficulties of defining the dangerousness 
standard. Part IV is a critique of the State’s failure to meet its burden in 
E.P.’s case and of the Alaska Supreme Court’s interpretation of the civil 
commitment statutes. It explains why the court should not have found 
E.P. to be a danger to himself and why this error resulted in a 
commitment that was more of a punishment for E.P.’s lifestyle choices 
than an effort to treat his mental illness. This section discusses the need 
for statutory revisions, including a more concrete definition of 
“dangerousness” and a clarification of the elements that must be proved 
in civil commitment cases. Finally, the Note proposes alternatives to 
 
 20. 205 P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009). 
 21. Id. at 1104. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See § 47.30.655(6) (“[P]ersons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to 
others [may] be committed only if there is a reasonable expectation of improving 
their mental condition.”). 
 24. 205 P.3d 1101. 
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civil commitments that would prevent individuals from being 
wrongfully committed in the future. 
I. E.P.: TO COMMIT OR NOT TO COMMIT? 
A. Involuntary Commitment Statutes 
Sections 47.30.655 through 47.30.770 of the Alaska Statutes govern 
the involuntary civil commitments of mentally ill individuals.25 Section 
47.30.655 of the Alaska Statutes states the Legislature’s purpose in 
writing these statutes—to “more adequately protect the legal rights of 
persons suffering from mental illness.”26 Other principles that guide 
these provisions are “that persons be treated in the least restrictive 
alternative environment consistent with their treatment needs” and 
“that persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to others be 
committed only if there is reasonable expectation of improving their 
mental condition.”27 
The other sections describe the elements that must be met in order 
to commit an individual involuntarily to a mental facility for thirty, 
ninety, or 180 days.28 A person must first be committed for thirty days 
before he can be re-committed for ninety days,29 and for ninety days 
before he can be re-committed for 180 days.30 The individual may then 
be committed for successive 180-day terms with no limit to the number 
of commitments.31 Generally, to commit an individual for any length of 
 
 25. §§ 47.30.655–47.30.770. 
 26. § 47.30.655. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See §§ 47.30.730–770. 
 29. § 47.30.740(a). Section 47.30.740(a) of the Alaska Statutes states: 
At any time during the respondent's 30-day commitment, the professional 
person in charge, or that person's professional designee, may file with the court 
a petition for a 90-day commitment of that respondent. The petition must 
include all material required under AS 47.30.730(a) except that references to “30 
days” shall be read as “90 days.” 
Id. 
 30. § 47.30.770(a). Section 47.30.770(a) of the Alaska Statutes states: 
The respondent shall be released from involuntary treatment at the expiration of 
90 days unless the professional person in charge files a petition for a 180-day 
commitment conforming to the requirements of AS 47.30.740(a) except that all 
references to “30-day commitment” shall be read as “the previous 90-day 
commitment” and all references to “90-day commitment” shall be read as “180-
day commitment.” 
Id. 
 31. § 47.30.770(c). Section 47.30.770(c) of the Alaska Statutes states that 
“[s]uccessive 180-day commitments are permissible on the same ground and 
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time, a court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the 
individual is mentally ill, and as a result is likely to cause harm to 
himself or others, or that he is gravely disabled.32 
“Gravely disabled” is “a condition in which a person as a result of 
mental illness is in danger of physical harm arising from . . . complete 
neglect of basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, or personal safety” or 
the person will suffer “abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress” 
associated with significant impairment of judgment if left untreated.33 In 
order to commit an individual for being gravely disabled, the State must 
show that there is a reasonable expectation that the individual will 
improve with treatment.34 
A person likely to cause serious harm is either a person who poses 
a substantial risk of bodily harm to that person’s self or to others or a 
person who manifests a current intent to carry out plans of serious 
harm.35 Unlike a person committed for grave disability, a person who 
poses a substantial risk of bodily harm to others may be committed 
without showing that the person’s condition will improve with 
 
under the same procedures as the original 180-day commitment. An order of 
commitment may not exceed 180 days.” Id. 
 32. § 47.30.730; § 47.30.740; § 47.30.755. Section 47.30.730(a) of the Alaska 
Statutes states: 
The petition must (1) allege that the respondent is mentally ill 
and as a result is likely to cause harm to self or others or is 
gravely disabled; (2) allege that the evaluation staff has 
considered but has not found that there are any less restrictive 
alternatives available that would adequately protect the 
respondent or others; or, if a less restrictive involuntary form 
of treatment is sought, specify the treatment and the basis for 
supporting it; (3) allege with respect to a gravely disabled 
respondent that there is reason to believe that the respondent's 
mental condition could be improved by the course of 
treatment sought; (4) allege that a specified treatment facility 
or less restrictive alternative that is appropriate to the 
respondent's condition has agreed to accept the respondent; 
(5) allege that the respondent has been advised of the need for, 
but has not accepted, voluntary treatment, and request that 
the court commit the respondent to the specified treatment 
facility or less restrictive alternative for a period not to exceed 
30 days; (6) list the prospective witnesses who will testify in 
support of commitment or involuntary treatment; and (7) list 
the facts and specific behavior of the respondent supporting 
the allegation in (1) of this subsection. 
§ 47.30.730(a). Sections 47.30.740 and 47.30.755 of the Alaska Statutes 
refer back to the factors listed in section 47.30.730(a). §§ 47.30.740, .755. 
 33. § 47.30.915(7). 
 34. § 47.30.730. 
 35. § 47.30.915(10). 
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treatment.36 However, the statute is unclear as to whether the State must 
show that a person who poses a substantial risk of bodily harm to 
himself will likely improve with treatment.37 
B. Mental Health History of E.P. 
E.P. had a history of huffing gasoline fumes and other substances, 
which damaged the frontal lobe of his brain and led to dementia, a 
personality disorder, and a “not otherwise specified psychotic 
disorder.”38 Prior to the commitments at issue in this case, E.P. was 
committed both voluntarily and involuntarily several times to API, 
which is a state-run locked mental institution.39 In May 2007, he was 
released to an assisted living facility in Big Lake, Alaska but left after a 
few days because he “got bored.”40 He voluntarily committed himself to 
API for the last time on May 13, 2007.41 
C. The Thirty-Day Commitment 
Soon after E.P. voluntarily committed himself to API, he expressed 
the desire to leave API to live with his sister.42 In order to prevent him 
from leaving, API filed a petition to commit E.P involuntarily for thirty 
days on August 2, 2007.43 According to Dr. Khanaz Khari, a psychiatrist 
at API and the sole witness for the State, E.P. was both gravely disabled 
and a threat to himself and others because he wished to continue huffing 
upon release.44 
Dr. Khari also testified that she did not expect E.P.’s condition to 
improve at API because API is not a substance abuse treatment facility.45 
She nevertheless recommended that E.P. be committed because API is a 
locked facility that would be able to restrict his access to harmful 
substances.46 Her theory was supported by the fact that E.P. was a 
 
 36. § 47.30.655(6). 
 37. See id.; § 47.30.730(3); see also infra Part IV.C. 
 38. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1103–04 (Alaska 2009). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1104; Brief of Appellant at 2, E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 
P.3d 1101 (Alaska 2009) (No. S-12853). 
 41. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 2. 
 42. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 43. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 2–3. 
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 46. Id. 
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model patient while he was at API because he did not engage in any 
dangerous behavior while he was committed.47 
Standing Master Andrew Brown found that E.P. was mentally ill 
and gravely disabled but did not find that he was a danger to himself or 
others.48 The superior court judge, following the recommendation of the 
standing master,49 then committed E.P. to API for thirty days50 pursuant 
to section 47.30.735(c) of the Alaska Statutes.51 E.P. objected to this 
commitment because according to the statute, a gravely disabled 
individual may be committed only if treatment will improve his 
condition, and Dr. Khari had testified that she did not expect E.P.’s 
condition to improve.52 API agreed with his legal argument but 
responded that E.P. should be committed because he was likely to harm 
himself, since he wished to continue huffing upon his release.53 
Alternatively, API argued that E.P. was a danger to others because he 
wanted to live with his sister upon release and she had small children 
who could be influenced by E.P.’s huffing habits.54 The superior court 
found in favor of API but did not elaborate on its reasoning.55 
D. The Ninety-Day Commitment 
After E.P. served his thirty-day commitment, API petitioned for an 
additional ninety-day commitment56 pursuant to section 47.30.755(a) of 
the Alaska Statutes.57 Dr. Khari was again the only witness for the 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49.  Section 2(b) of the Alaska Rules of Probate Procedure provides that a 
“master’s report is not binding until approved by a superior court judge” but 
also that a “master’s order of commitment to a treatment facility is effective 
pending superior court review.” ALASKA R. PROB. P. § 2(b). Thus, during the 
commitment proceedings when the superior court makes a finding, it is acting 
off a recommendation from the standing master. 
 50. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104–05. 
 51. Section 47.30.735(c) of the Alaska Statutes states that a court may commit 
an individual for thirty days if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
individual is “mentally ill and as a result likely to cause harm to [himself] or 
others or is gravely disabled.” ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2010). 
 52. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1105. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Section 47.30.755(a) of the Alaska Statutes states that after the time limit 
specified in section 47.30.735(c), a court may commit an individual for ninety 
days if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is “mentally 
ill and as a result likely to cause harm to [himself] or others, or is gravely 
disabled.” ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.755(a) (2010). 
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State.58 She testified that E.P.’s condition had not changed since the last 
hearing and reiterated that he had not exhibited any dangerous behavior 
at the hospital.59 Master Brown recommended that E.P. be committed on 
the grounds of grave disability and again did not find that he was a 
danger to himself or others.60 During the superior court’s review of 
Master Brown’s recommendation, E.P. objected on the same grounds as 
before—that if he was committed because he was gravely disabled, API 
was statutorily required to show a reasonable belief that he would 
improve with treatment.61 API argued alternatively that “other people 
could be harmed as a result of [E.P’s] choice to drink and abuse 
substances”—again referring to the children of E.P.’s sister.62 The 
superior court and API agreed with E.P. that it was error to commit him 
based on the theory that he was gravely disabled because he would not 
improve with treatment.63 However, the superior court concluded that 
the evidence provided at both the thirty-day and ninety-day 
commitment hearings supported the finding that E.P. was a danger to 
himself.64 
 
E. The 180-Day Commitment 
 
When E.P.’s ninety-day commitment expired, API petitioned for a 
180-day commitment65 pursuant to section 47.30.770(b) of the Alaska 
Statutes.66 The facts of this commitment are largely similar to the first 
two: Dr. Khari was the only witness, and she testified that E.P. had not 
shown any dangerous behavior except his desire to huff.67 However, this 
time a different standing master found E.P. both gravely disabled and a 
danger to himself.68 E.P. again objected, but nevertheless the superior 
court judge committed him upon a finding that he was a danger to 
himself.69 
 
 58. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1105. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655(6) (2010)). 
 62. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. at 1106; Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 11. 
 64. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 12. 
 65. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1105. 
 66. Section 47.30.770(b) of the Alaska Statutes states that if a court finds by 
clear and convincing evidence that the grounds set out in section 47.30.775 are 
present, then the court may order an individual committed for an additional 180 
days from the date that the ninety-day treatment period would have expired. 
ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.770(b) (2010). 
 67. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1105. 
 68. Id. at 1105–06. 
 69. Id. at 1106. 
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II. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT’S OPINION 
Although all three of E.P.’s commitments had expired and E.P. had 
passed away by the time his case reached the Alaska Supreme Court, the 
court nevertheless opted to decide the otherwise-moot case because the 
questions that it raised are likely to be repeated and are important to the 
public interest.70 The court reviewed findings of fact for clear error and 
questions of law and statutory interpretation de novo.71 
The court first dealt with the disparity in the language of sections 
47.30.655 and 47.30.730 of the Alaska Statutes.72 Section 47.30.655 was 
added in 1981 and is the preamble that applies to the other sections of 
the Alaska Statutes that govern civil commitments.73 It states that 
“persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to others [can] be 
committed only if there is reasonable expectation of improving their 
mental condition.”74 On the other hand, section 47.30.730, which governs 
thirty-day commitments, only requires the State to show that there is 
reasonable expectation of improvement for individuals who are gravely 
disabled.75 The plain reading of section 47.30.655 suggests that the State 
must show a likelihood of improvement for persons who are dangerous 
to themselves and persons who are gravely disabled, but section 
47.30.730 imposes this requirement only when the person is gravely 
disabled.76 The court held that the substantive statute (section 47.30.730) 
controls over the preamble (section 47.30.655), so the State needs to 
show likelihood of improvement only for individuals who are gravely 
disabled.77 
The problem was that E.P. was committed because he was a danger 
to himself78 and the statutes were unclear as to whether a showing of 
potential improvement was required.79 The court rejected E.P.’s 
argument that the Legislature intended for those who are likely to harm 
themselves to be treated equally to gravely disabled individuals.80 The 
court reasoned that the opinion from Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric 
 
 70. Id. at 1106–08 (citing Akpik v. State, 115 P.3d 532, 536 (Alaska 2005) 
(articulating three factors courts consider when deciding whether to hear moot 
cases)). 
 71. Id. at 1106. 
 72. Id. at 1108. 
 73. Id. The statute was revised by 1981 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 84, § 1. 
 74. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655(6) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 75. § 47.30.730. 
 76. See §§ 47.30.655(6), 47.30.730. 
 77. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1108–09. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See §§ 47.30.655(6), 47.30.730(3). 
 80. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1108–09, 1112. 
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Institute81 distinguished the two groups, explaining that whereas 
“danger to self” is concerned with active inclinations to inflict harm, 
“grave disability” is more concerned with an inability to function.82 
Therefore, the court concluded that if E.P. was committed because he 
was a danger to himself, API did not have to show that he would 
probably improve with treatment at the facility.83 
The court then analyzed whether API had met its burden in 
showing that E.P.’s commitment was necessary.84 API first needed to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that E.P. was afflicted with a 
mental illness.85 It did so by showing that E.P.’s organic brain damage 
qualified as a separate mental illness from his drug addiction and 
impaired his ability to exercise judgment.86 
Next, the court analyzed whether API had met its burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that E.P. was likely to cause 
harm to himself or others.87 Section 47.30.735(c) of the Alaska Statutes 
allows commitment of people who are “likely to cause harm to [self] or 
others” but does not define what “likely to cause harm” means.88 The 
court relied on the following definition of “likely to cause serious harm” 
from a different section of the statute:89 
A person who (A) poses a substantial risk of bodily 
harm to that person’s self, as manifested by recent 
behavior causing, attempting, or threatening that harm; 
(B) poses a substantial risk of harm to others as 
manifested by recent behavior causing, attempting, or 
threatening harm, and is likely in the near future to 
cause physical injury, physical abuse, or substantial 
property damage to another person; or (C) manifests a 
current intent to carry out plans of serious harm to that 
person’s self or another.90 
The court concluded that E.P.’s intent to continue to huff 
substances qualified as recent behavior causing a substantial risk of 
 
 81. 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007). 
 82. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1109 (quoting Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 376). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1110. 
 88. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2010). 
 89. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1110 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(10) (2008)). 
 90. § 47.30.915(10). 
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bodily harm to self and a current intent to carry out plans of serious 
harm.91 
The court found no need to address the issue of whether E.P. was a 
danger to others because it found that he was a danger to himself.92 
Affirming all of E.P.’s commitments, the court held that the statutes did 
not require API to show that E.P. was likely to improve with treatment.93 
III. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT 
Part IV will discuss specifically why the Alaska Supreme Court 
should not have affirmed E.P.’s commitment. However, it is important 
first to understand what involuntary commitments entail and how these 
commitments have previously been treated by the law. 
A. Involuntary Commitments are a Substantial Deprivation of 
Liberty 
“[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration 
against one’s will, whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’”94 Courts have 
acknowledged that involuntary commitments substantially deprive 
individuals of freedom in its most basic aspects95 and are a “direct form 
of physical restraint.”96 This is the reason why the United States criminal 
justice system hinges on the maxim, “innocent until proven guilty,” 
which requires the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is 
justified in incarcerating an individual and taking away his 
constitutionally protected liberties.97 
Criminals are not the only individuals who are routinely 
committed to locked institutions against their will—states also often 
commit mentally ill individuals to mental hospitals. It is difficult to 
avoid the fact that civil commitments also result in the “destruction of 
an individual’s personal freedoms” that are “scarcely less total than that 
effected by confinement in a penitentiary.”98 Like criminals, those civilly 
committed are often locked in small rooms, deprived of access to their 
own bank accounts, forced to conform to strict daily routines, and given 
 
 91. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1110. 
 92. Id. at 1111. 
 93. Id. at 1112. 
 94. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967). 
 95. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979). 
 96. In re Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1979) (citing In re Roger S., 569 P.2d 1286, 
1291 (Cal. 1977)). 
 97. See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24. 
 98. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 4. 
USAHACHAROENPORN_FINAL 5/5/2011 3:26:48 PM 
2011 INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT 201 
drugs against their will.99 In addition, the stigmatizing consequences 
and the mandatory behavior modifications associated with mental 
hospitals amount to a “grievous loss” even to a prisoner being 
transferred from a prison to a mental hospital.100 
Not only do individuals who are civilly committed suffer from 
physical restraints and the loss of important rights, they also suffer from 
severe social stigma, which in some cases is even more debilitating than 
the other consequences of involuntary commitments.101 Many people 
have an “irrational fear of the mentally ill” and view them with “distrust 
and even loathing.”102 The mentally ill are often victimized and treated 
as social outcasts, which lowers their confidence and self-esteem and 
affects their ability to obtain employment.103 Furthermore, a significant 
portion of society assumes that all mentally ill individuals are 
dangerous.104 
Because so many personal rights are at stake when a person is 
committed to a mental hospital, the Supreme Court of the United States 
held that a state may not commit an individual unless the length and 
type of commitment relate to the state’s reason for the commitment.105 A 
state can civilly commit individuals under the reach of its parens patraie 
powers to provide care to citizens who are not able to care for 
themselves or under its police power to protect the public from 
particularly dangerous individuals when it is “reasonably necessary” 
 
 99. See id. at 5–6. 
 100. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980). 
 101. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 6–7; Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26; see also Patrick W. 
Corrigan et al., Structural Levels of Mental Illness Stigma and Discrimination, 30 
SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 481, 482–85, 489 (2004). 
 102. Roulet, 590 P.2d at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Peter 
Byrne, Stigma of Mental Illness and Ways of Diminishing It, 6 ADVANCES IN 
PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 65, 65–67 (2000); Jack K. Martin et al., Of Fear and 
Loathing: The Role of 'Disturbing Behavior,' Labels, and Causal Attributions in 
Shaping Public Attitudes toward People with Mental Illness, 41 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 208, 215–20 (2000); Otto K. Wahl, Mental Health Consumers' Experience of 
Stigma, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 467, 470–71 (1999). 
 103.  See Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Alaska 
2007); see also Wahl, supra note 102, at 470–72. 
 104. Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: Labels, Causes, 
Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1332–33 (1999); 
J.C. Phelen & B.G. Link, The Growing Belief that People with Mental Illnesses 
are Violent: The Role of the Dangerousness Criterion for Civil Commitment, 33 
SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY (SUPP.) S7, S7–S8, S10 (1998). In 
reality, according to a recent statistical study, severe mental illness alone is not a 
good predictor of violent behavior, although the relationship is complicated. See 
Eric B. Elbogen & Sally C. Johnson, The Intricate Link Between Violence and 
Mental Disorder, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 152, 155–59 (2009) (“[S]evere 
mental illness is not a robust predictor of future violence….”). 
 105. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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and not “duly oppressive.”106 However, these powers do not extend so 
far as to allow a state to commit an individual solely upon a finding that 
the individual is mentally ill.107 Therefore, many states’ commitment 
statutes mandate a finding of both mental illness and either: (1) grave 
disability, in which case the state has parens patraie power108 because the 
person is so debilitated that he cannot care for himself; or (2) some form 
of dangerousness, in which case the state has police power to protect the 
public from the individual.109 Aside from these two government 
interests, the main purpose of civil commitment is to treat the mentally 
ill, not to punish them.110 
Mentally ill individuals should be placed in outpatient treatment 
centers whenever doing so would still allow the state to achieve its goals 
because community treatment centers are usually “less restrictive” than 
mental hospitals.111 Recognizing the importance of establishing 
outpatient treatment centers, President Jimmy Carter formed the 
Commission on Mental Health, the purpose of which was to create a 
large national network of community programs, including halfway 
houses, family and group homes, private hospitals, foster-care facilities, 
and community mental health centers.112 The Commission 
recommended at least $275 million from Congress be used to establish 
these community-based programs so that the number of patients in 
mental hospitals could be decreased.113 Even though Congress 
eventually rejected this recommendation, the proposal provided a 
model for states to follow.114 Further, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act115 mandates that public entities must administer treatment programs 
in the most integrated setting possible while still meeting the needs of 
the mentally ill.116 
 
 106. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. 
 107. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975). 
 108. Parens patraie is “[t]he state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its 
capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009). 
 109. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.655–770 (2010); ALA. CODE § 22-52-37 
(2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-47-207 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631 (West 
2011). 
 110. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 546–47 (9th Cir. 1983); Addington, 441 U.S. 
at 428. 
 111. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
 112. Meredith Karasch, Note, Where Involuntary Commitment, Civil Liberties, 
and the Right to Mental Health Care Collide: An Overview of California's Mental 
Illness System, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 493, 501 (2003). 
 113. Id. at 502. 
 114. Id. 
 115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2010). 
 116. See id. 
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The State of Alaska has also recognized the rights of the mentally ill 
through its civil commitment statutes117 and three recent Alaska 
Supreme Court cases.118 In Myers, the court ruled that drugs may not be 
administered to mentally ill individuals without consent unless the 
court finds that the medication is in the best interests of the patient and 
there are no less intrusive alternatives.119 The Wetherhorn court held that 
in order to be involuntarily committed on a theory of grave disability, an 
individual must be so substantially incapacitated that he “is incapable of 
surviving safely in freedom.”120 Finally, the court in Wayne B. ruled that 
a mentally ill individual has the right to transcripts from his 
commitment hearings and failure to provide these transcripts can result 
in reversible error.121 
B. The Substantial Deprivation of Rights in Involuntary 
Commitments Triggers an Elevated Standard of Proof 
Under Alaska law, as required by the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Addington v. Texas,122 the State always carries the 
burden of proving that a commitment is necessary, either because the 
individual is gravely disabled or because he is a danger.123 In Addington, 
the Supreme Court confronted the problem of what standard of proof 
due process requires states to apply in civil commitment proceedings 
and decided that states must prove that the commitment is necessary by 
at least clear and convincing evidence.124 The standard of proof must 
“reflect[] the value society places on individual liberty” and minimize 
the risk of a wrong judgment.125 The Court reasoned that an individual’s 
interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is so grave that 
due process requires a standard that is higher than the preponderance of 
the evidence standard that is usually applied in civil cases.126 
The Court considered using the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, which is applied in criminal cases,127 but concluded that this 
 
 117. ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.30.655–770 (2010). 
 118. Wayne B. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 192 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2008); 
Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371 (Alaska 2007); Myers v. 
Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006). 
 119. Myers, 138 P.3d at 239. 
 120. Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 384. 
 121. Wayne B., 192 P.3d at 991. 
 122. 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979). 
 123. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.755(c) (2010). 
 124. Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. 
 125. See id. at 425 (citations omitted). 
 126. Id. at 427. 
 127. Id. 
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standard of proof is not necessary because in civil commitment 
proceedings, states do not exercise their power in a punitive sense. 
Additionally, erroneous commitments can be avoided by the “layers of 
professional review and observations of the patient’s condition, and the 
concern of family and friends.”128 Further, it would be too difficult for 
states to prove the elements of a civil commitment beyond a reasonable 
doubt because the evidence usually consists only of psychologists’ and 
psychiatrists’ expert testimonies, which are fallible.129 The Court settled 
on the clear and convincing standard as a minimum but left it to the 
states to decide whether to apply a higher standard.130 
The Alaska Legislature adopted the clear and convincing evidence 
standard,131 and the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized the 
importance of adhering to that standard because “there is a danger that 
the mentally ill may be confined merely because they are physically 
unattractive or socially eccentric.”132 Further, the court realized that an 
individual could potentially be committed solely for displaying an 
abnormal behavior that is seen by some as a sign of a mental or 
emotional disorder even though it falls within the normal range of 
acceptable behavior.133 The use of the clear and convincing standard 
helps ensure that only those who truly need to be committed are subject 
to the confines of mental hospitals.134 
C. The Difficulties of Defining “Dangerousness” 
One aspect of commitment statutes that courts have struggled with 
is how to define “dangerousness.” The problem began when the 
Supreme Court of the United States found that a state cannot 
constitutionally confine a non-dangerous individual without proving 
why the commitment is necessary either for the individual or for 
society.135 
This holding created a need for the states to define the 
dangerousness requirement. The dangerousness requirement varies by 
state, but there are three major categories of statutes: (1) those that 
 
 128. Id. at 428–29. 
 129. Id. at 429. 
 130. Id. at 432–33. 
 131. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735(c) (2010). 
 132. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 378 (Alaska 2007) 
(quoting O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–26. 
 135. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 576. 
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require evidence of a recent dangerous overt act; (2) those that require 
an imminent threat that the dangerous behavior is likely to occur again; 
and (3) those that require only that the person pose a substantial risk of 
harm to himself or others.136 However, there are problems with all three 
standards. It is difficult to decide what kind of behavior constitutes a 
recent dangerous overt act. There is no evidence that a recent overt act 
makes a future one more likely, and basing a commitment on a recent 
overt act turns the commitment from a preventative measure into a 
punishment for past behavior.137 The imminent threat requirement 
involves a large amount of speculation and is unreliable, and the 
substantial risk standard, which Alaska uses, is vague.138 The overt act 
and imminent threat standards tend to be underinclusive—they do not 
encompass some individuals who are dangerous and should be 
committed.  On the other hand, the substantial risk of harm standard 
tends to be overinclusive in that it allows some individuals to be 
committed when they are not dangerous.139 
In most commitment hearings, the majority of the evidence 
presented comes from psychologists’ expert testimonies.140 Prediction of 
dangerousness involves two parts: identifying relevant risk factors and 
allocating the appropriate weight to each factor.141 Studies have shown 
that people struggle greatly with objectively predicting dangerousness 
because humans allow preconceived notions to influence their 
perception of the data.142 Other obstacles include 
“[o]verconfidence, hindsight bias, and the inability to assess covariation 
accurately.”143 Clinicians’ predictions result in false positives, or 
commitment of those who are not dangerous, about fifty-four to eighty 
percent of the time and are no more accurate than flipping a coin.144 
Another study found that only one out of three people whom clinicians 
predicted to be dangerous actually engaged in dangerous behavior.145 
 
 136. David T. Simpson, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness 
Standard and its Problems, 63 N.C. L. REV. 241, 247 (1984). 
 137. Id. at 249–51. 
 138. Id. at 250. 
 139. See id. at 252. 
 140. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979). 
 141. M. Neil Browne & Ronda R. Harrison-Spoerl, Putting Expert Testimony in 
its Epistemological Place: What Predictions of Dangerousness in Court Can Teach Us, 
91 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1194 (2008). 
 142. Id. at 1194–95. 
 143. Id. at 1195. 
 144. See id. at 1175. 
 145. Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to “Predict 
Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretations of the “Dangerousness” 
Literature, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 47 (1994). 
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Use of actuarial methods, which consist of plugging variables like past 
behavior and test responses into a formula, have consistently been more 
reliable than human judgment.146 Even with these methods—the 
accuracy of which exceeds chance—many nonviolent individuals would 
need to be committed to stop one violent act.147 
The unreliability of expert testimony regarding dangerousness is 
especially troublesome because juries, who are often impressed by these 
witnesses’ credentials, may give special weight to experts’ testimonies.148 
Further, juries are easily impressed by irrelevant factors such as the 
expert’s appearance or speaking ability.149 Contrary to popular opinion, 
the American Psychiatric Association itself concluded: “[N]either 
psychiatrists nor anyone else ha[s] demonstrated an ability to predict 
future violence or dangerousness,” and “the unreliability of psychiatric 
predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by now an established 
fact within the profession.”150 Along the same lines, Justice Blackmun 
once stated that mental health professionals’ predictions of 
dangerousness are so unreliable that they should be constitutionally 
impermissible in capital cases.151 
IV. E.P.: NOT TO COMMIT 
Keeping in mind the severe effects of involuntary commitment, the 
high standard of proof that is required in commitment hearings, and the 
fact that it is difficult to define dangerousness and to predict whether 
someone will be dangerous, E.P. was wrongfully committed for three 
main reasons. First, E.P. was gravely disabled and not a danger to 
himself, but the State could not commit E.P. for being gravely disabled 
without showing that he would improve with treatment. Second, 
because the State was statutorily precluded from pursuing the gravely 
disabled theory, it was forced to pursue the theory that E.P. was a 
danger to himself and failed to meet its burden of proving his 
dangerousness with clear and convincing evidence. Third, even if E.P. 
was a danger to himself, the State was still required to show that he 
would likely improve with treatment during his commitment, and it 
failed to do so. Due to ambiguity in the statutes and the Alaska Supreme 
 
 146. Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 141, at 1193, 1198; Alec Buchanan, 
Risk of Violence by Psychiatric Patients: Beyond the “Actuarial Versus Clinical” 
Assessment Debate, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 184, 184 (2008). 
 147. Buchanan, supra note 146, at 188. 
 148. Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 141, at 1132–37. 
 149. Id. at 1136–37. 
 150. Otto, supra note 145, at 49 (citations omitted). 
 151. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 923–24 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Court’s misinterpretation of this ambiguity, the State was relieved of its 
burden of proving that E.P. would improve with treatment. 
 As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized, civil 
commitments are a “grievous loss” to the patient because of the 
stigmatizations and mandatory behavior modifications associated with 
mental hospitals.152 In fact, E.P. may have been better off had he been 
charged with a crime because criminals are afforded several due process 
rights that are not available to those who are civilly committed.153 For 
example, he would have had the right to have a maximum time limit to 
his commitment.154 Instead, he was deprived of his due process rights 
and committed to API with little evidence and even less effort to help 
treat his illness through less restrictive means.155 As a result, he was 
taken away from his family and forced to comply with hospital 
restrictions without receiving the benefit of treatment.156 
 
A.  E.P. Was More Likely Gravely Disabled than a Danger to 
Himself 
 
The State of Alaska cannot commit mentally ill individuals unless it 
can show that they are either gravely disabled, a danger to themselves, 
or a danger to others.157 Even though Master Brown,158 who was the 
factfinder during E.P.’s first two hearings, found that E.P. was gravely 
disabled and refused to find that he was a danger,159 the Alaska 
Supreme Court ultimately approved E.P.’s commitment because it held 
that the superior court was justified in finding that he was a danger to 
himself.160 The State had more evidence showing E.P. was gravely 
disabled than it did showing he was a danger to himself or others.161 
However, the State chose to pursue the theory that E.P. was a danger 
because the State explicitly admitted that E.P. could not improve, and so 
it could not commit him for being gravely disabled.162 
 
 152. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980). 
 153. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.47.100, 12.47.110 (2010). 
 154. § 12.47.110. 
 155. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 14. 
 156. See E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Alaska 2009). 
 157. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730 (2010). 
 158. This refers to Master Andrew Brown, who conducted the thirty-day 
hearings. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 3. Master Jonathon Lack, who 
conducted the 180-day commitment hearing, found that E.P. was both gravely 
disabled and likely to harm himself. Id. at 14. 
 159. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 160. Id. at 1112. 
 161. See id. at 1104. 
 162. See id. 
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Even though the superior court and the Alaska Supreme Court had 
the right to review the standing master’s findings,163 appellate courts 
should nevertheless give some deference to the fact that the standing 
master was the only one who actually heard Dr. Khari and E.P. testify.164 
The standing master was in the best position to determine whether E.P. 
was gravely disabled or a danger based on E.P.’s demeanor in court and 
the doctor’s testimony, and he concluded that E.P. was gravely disabled, 
not a danger.165 
Master Brown was correct in his conclusion that E.P. was gravely 
disabled. According to section 47.30.915 of the Alaska Statutes, a person 
who is gravely disabled is in “danger of physical harm arising from 
complete neglect for . . . personal safety as to render serious accident, 
illness, or death highly probable if care by another is not taken” or, if not 
treated, will suffer from severe abnormal mental distress “associated 
with significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior.”166 E.P. 
fulfills not just one but both of these elements. First, he neglected his 
personal safety because he chose to huff even though it had already 
caused some brain damage.167 Second, E.P. suffered from brain damage, 
which impaired his judgment.168 For example, Master Brown found that 
E.P. “cannot perceive and understand reality” and “[h]is judgment is 
extremely poor and he is unable to make rational decisions.”169 Further, 
Dr. Khari, the witness for the State, testified that E.P. “lacks insight and 
judgment and cannot understand how huffing gas harms him.”170 
However, as E.P. pointed out to the superior court judge, he could 
not be committed for being gravely disabled because the extent of his 
brain damage precluded any improvement with treatment at API.171 
Both parties agreed that the Alaska Statutes172 require the State to show 
that a person who is committed for being gravely disabled could 
improve with treatment,173 whereas it was debated whether this 
requirement is present for those who are a danger to themselves.174 
Therefore, the State conceded E.P.’s point and decided to pursue the 
 
 163. See id. at 1106. 
 164. See id. at 1104. 
 165. See id. 
 166. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(7) (2010). 
 167. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.730(3) (2010). 
 173. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 174. See id. at 1108. 
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theory that E.P. was a danger to himself.175 But this theory failed for two 
reasons: E.P. was not a danger to himself, and even if he was, the State 
still had to show that he could have improved with treatment. 
B. The State Failed to Meet its Burden of Proving that E.P. Was 
Likely to Harm Himself 
API failed to show that E.P. was a danger by clear and convincing 
evidence, which is the minimum standard of proof that is required by 
the U.S. Constitution176 and section 47.30.755 of the Alaska Statutes. The 
only evidence that the State put forth was the testimony of Dr. Khari, a 
psychologist that worked at API, who repeatedly stated that E.P. 
displayed no dangerous behavior while he was committed (although 
she did say that he would resume huffing if released).177 Further, the 
statutes do not clearly define “dangerousness,”178 thus leaving a lot of 
discretion to the courts. 
As a result of the dearth of evidence, there were several 
inconsistencies among the opinions of the standing masters, the superior 
court, and the Alaska Supreme Court, and among the findings for the 
thirty-, ninety-, and 180-day commitments. At the thirty- and ninety-day 
commitment hearings, the standing master found that E.P. was gravely 
disabled but did not find that he was a danger to himself or others.179 At 
the 180-day commitment hearing, a different standing master found that 
E.P. was both gravely disabled and a danger to himself.180 The superior 
court committed E.P. for thirty days without elaborating on whether it 
found him gravely disabled or a danger to himself or others.181 For the 
ninety- and 180-day commitments, the superior court agreed that E.P. 
was a danger to himself and found that he was not gravely disabled.182 
The Alaska Supreme Court found all three commitments were justified 
because E.P. was a danger to himself.183 
Dr. Khari’s testimony did not show that E.P. was a danger to 
himself by clear and convincing evidence. Dr. Khari did identify some 
risk factors during her testimony: E.P. had a history of huffing gas and 
using alcohol; he expressed a desire to continue engaging in these 
 
 175. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 11–12. 
 176. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). 
 177. See E.P., 205 P.3d at 1105. 
 178. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915 (2010). 
 179. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104–05. 
 180. Id. at 1105. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1105–06. 
 183. Id. at 1112. 
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activities; and because of his brain damage, he lacked insight and 
judgment.184 However, she also testified that E.P. exhibited no 
dangerous behavior185 and that he was a model patient at API.186 These 
statements taken together do not amount to clear and convincing 
evidence that E.P. was a danger to himself. As discussed above, fifty-
four to eighty percent of the individuals that experts predict will be 
dangerous do not later exhibit any dangerous behavior at all.187 Thus, 
reasonable doubts regarding predictions of a person’s future 
dangerousness, like the doubts presented by Dr. Khari’s testimony, 
should be resolved in favor of finding the person not dangerous. 
One of the reasons why the Supreme Court of the United States 
concluded that a clear and convincing standard, rather than a higher 
standard, should be used in civil commitment hearings is that erroneous 
commitments can be avoided or corrected by “layers of professional 
review and observation[s] of the patient’s condition, and the concern of 
family.”188 Here, E.P. was not given layers of professional review 
because only one doctor testified at all three of his hearings.189 Concern 
of family did end up being a factor in E.P’s case because E.P.’s family 
was willing to help; his sister was willing to take care of E.P. so that he 
would not have to live in a hospital.190 However, this fact was actually 
used against E.P. because the courts believed that he would be a poor 
role model for his sister’s children.191 Therefore, not only did the State 
fail to meet its burden of proof, but the safeguards that the Supreme 
Court predicted would prevent wrongful commitments failed to protect 
E.P.192 
C. Those Who are Harmful to Themselves Can Be Committed Only 
When the State Shows They Will Improve With Treatment 
Even if E.P. was a danger to himself, the State was statutorily 
required to show that there was a reasonable expectation that his mental 
condition would improve, which was a burden that the State failed to 
carry. The Alaska Legislature acknowledged that the rights of the 
mentally ill must be protected by ensuring that commitments are 
 
 184. Id. at 1104. 
 185. Id. at 1105. 
 186. Id. at 1104. 
 187. Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 141, at 1175. 
 188. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428–29 (1979). 
 189. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104–05. 
 190. Id. at 1104. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428–29. 
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primarily used for treatment unless the safety of others is at stake.193 
Therefore, it enacted section 47.30.655 of the Alaska Statutes (hereinafter 
“the preamble”), which states the principle “that persons who are 
mentally ill but not dangerous to others be committed only if there is 
reasonable expectation of improving their mental condition.”194 This 
means that the State was required to show that E.P.’s condition would 
improve at the mental hospital because he was found to be a danger to 
himself, not to others. The parties agreed that E.P. would likely never 
improve with any kind of treatment and that the reason he was kept at 
API was to keep him from having access to gasoline.195 E.P.’s 
commitment was a direct contradiction of the Legislature’s intent to 
protect the rights of mentally ill individuals who are not a danger to 
others. 
The Alaska Supreme Court wrongly reasoned that section 47.30.730 
of the Alaska Statutes, which requires the State to show that there is 
reasonable expectation of improvement only for individuals who are 
gravely disabled, trumps the preamble.196 The relevant part of section 
47.30.730 states: “[W]ith respect to a gravely disabled respondent [the 
State must show that] there is reason to believe that the respondent’s 
mental condition could be improved by the course of treatment 
sought.”197 In other words, section 47.30.730 states that gravely disabled 
individuals must reasonably improve with treatment whereas the 
preamble states that all groups except those who are dangerous to others 
must reasonably improve with treatment. 
The Alaska Supreme Court itself stated that “it is an established 
principle of statutory construction that all sections of an act are to be 
construed together so that all have meaning and no section conflicts 
with another.”198 The two sections do not contradict each other because 
although section 47.30.730 does not specifically mention that those who 
are dangerous to themselves must reasonably improve with treatment, it 
does not preclude the requirement.199 Further, the court has also stated 
that when a “section deals with a subject in general terms and another 
deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two 
should be harmonized, if possible.”200 Section 47.30.730 deals with the 
 
 193. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655 (2010). 
 194. § 47.30.655(6) (emphasis added). 
 195. E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 196. Id. at 1108. 
 197. § 47.30.730(3). 
 198.  N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. State, Dep’t of Natural Res., 2 P.3d 629, 635 
(Alaska 2000) (quoting In re Hutchinson, 577 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Alaska 1978)). 
 199. See §§ 47.30.730, 47.30.655. 
 200. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 2 P.3d at 635 (quoting Hutchinson, 577 P.2d at 1075). 
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subject in specific terms because it mentions people who are gravely 
disabled in particular, whereas the preamble deals with the subject 
generally by encompassing all individuals besides those who are 
dangerous to others.201 One can harmonize these two sections by 
reading them to mean that all individuals who are not dangerous to 
others (including those who are gravely disabled) must improve with 
treatment in order to be involuntarily committed. 
The statutes should be read to require a showing of reasonable 
improvement for those who are dangerous to themselves because the 
Alaska Supreme Court seeks to “give effect to the intent of the 
Legislature.”202 The Alaska Legislature wrote the preamble for a 
reason—to make its intent clear. The Legislature chose to write 
specifically that persons who are mentally ill but not dangerous to 
others must reasonably be expected to improve with treatment in order 
to be committed. The preamble clearly states in its first sentence that it 
applies to sections “47.30.660 and 47.30.670–47.30.915” of the Alaska 
Statutes, and section 47.30.730 falls within this range.203 Therefore, the 
Alaska Legislature did not intend for section 47.30.730 to trump the 
preamble. 
In Wetherhorn, the Alaska Supreme Court stated that it interprets 
the Alaska Statutes “in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”204 
Reading the Alaska Statutes to require a showing of probable 
improvement for those who are dangerous to themselves is consistent 
with precedent and policy.205 In the three most recent cases regarding 
involuntary commitments, the Alaska Supreme Court construed the law 
in favor of expanding rights for the mentally ill.206 The court’s reading of 
 
 201. §§ 47.30.730, 47.30.655. 
 202. See N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr., 2 P.3d at 634 (citing In re Johnstone, 2 P.3d 1226, 
1231 (Alaska 2000)). 
 203. §§ 47.30.730, 47.30.655. 
 204. Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 375 (Alaska 2007). 
 205. Cf. Wayne B. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 192 P.3d 989 (Alaska 2008); 
Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d 371; Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 
2006). 
 206. See Wayne B., 192 P.3d at 990 (vacating orders committing a patient and 
requiring administration of psychotropic drugs on the grounds that the lower 
court erred in not transcribing the standing master’s original hearing on the 
matter); Wetherhorn, 156 P.3d at 374 (holding “that the definition of ‘gravely 
disabled’ in AS 47.30.915(7)(B) is constitutional if construed to require a level of 
incapacity so substantial that the respondent is incapable of surviving safely in 
freedom”); Myers, 138 P.3d at 239 (holding that unless there is an emergency, a 
state may only administer psychotropic drugs to a non-consenting patient if a 
court determines that the “medication is in the best interests of the patient and 
no less intrusive alternative treatment is available“). 
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the statutes in this case directly contradicts the trend towards protecting 
the rights of individuals who have been involuntarily committed. 
The Alaska Legislature recognized the importance of requiring the 
State to show that a person who is dangerous to himself will improve 
with treatment.207 However, this requirement was ignored in E.P.’s case. 
API openly admitted that E.P.’s condition would not improve and that 
the sole purpose of his commitment was to keep him in a locked facility 
to prevent him from getting access to gasoline.208 Had the commitment 
statutes been correctly interpreted, E.P.’s commitment would not stand 
because he was not being treated for his condition and because the State 
would not have been able to meet its burden of proving all of the 
requisite elements of a civil commitment. 
A better way to treat E.P.’s condition would have been to put him 
in a specialty outpatient substance abuse program or treatment center. 
Treatments for inhalant addicts are complicated and require more 
resources than treatments for people addicted to other types of drugs.209 
However, there was no real effort to find E.P. an appropriate treatment 
center  that could provide these resources either in Alaska or in another 
state.210 The Alaska Statutes require that the commitment be the least 
restrictive possible,211 and API was not the least restrictive alternative 
for E.P. In fact, Dr. Khari admitted that “the only benefit that API 
provided was the structure of a locked facility.”212 Furthermore, simply 
locking up inhalant addicts and providing no other treatment is not a 
recommended method of dealing with inhalant abuse.213 
D. Suggested Alterations to the Current Commitment System 
The wrongful commitment of E.P. should be used as an example to 
prevent future wrongful commitments. This case helped shed light on 
 
 207. See § 47.30.655(6). This section requires “that persons who are mentally ill 
but not dangerous to others be committed only if there is a reasonable 
expectation of improving their mental condition.” Id. This wording places 
mentally ill individuals into two groups: those who are dangerous to others and 
those who are not dangerous to others. Because the statute does not identify to 
which group those who are a danger to themselves belong, the literal reading 
suggests that they belong to the latter group. Thus, they can be committed only 
if there is a reasonable expectation of improving their mental condition. 
 208. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Alaska 2009). 
 209. Ctr. for Substance Abuse Treatment, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Serv., Inhalants, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT ADVISORY, Mar. 2003, at 1, 3–5, 
available at http://www.inhalants.org/Inhalants_March2003.pdf. 
 210. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 4. 
 211. § 47.30.655. 
 212. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 4. 
 213. See Inhalants, supra note 209, at 3–5. 
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several areas that can be improved within the current civil commitment 
system in Alaska. First, the Alaska Legislature should more clearly 
define “dangerousness” within the specific sections that deal with civil 
commitments and should provide patients the right to be diagnosed by 
more than one mental health professional in regards to dangerousness. 
Second, the Legislature should specify that a showing of probable 
improvement is needed for commitments of individuals who are found 
to be dangerous to themselves. Last, the State should invest in more 
efficient outpatient treatment facilities and programs. 
The lack of a definition of “likely to cause harm” in the relevant 
civil commitment statutes214 led the Alaska Supreme Court to rely on a 
definition from another section of the statute.215 It also caused 
disagreement among Master Brown, the superior court judge, and the 
Alaska Supreme Court regarding whether E.P. was likely to cause harm 
to himself.216 Even if the Legislature intended for the definition from 
section 47.30.915 of the Alaska Statutes to apply to the sections that 
governed E.P.’s case, the given definition is still too vague. Section 
47.30.915 defines a person who is “likely to cause serious harm” as one 
who “poses a substantial risk of bodily harm . . . as manifested by recent 
behavior causing, attempting, or threatening that harm” or “manifests a 
current intent to carry out plans of serious harm.”217 This leaves a lot of 
discretion to the courts to decide what constitutes substantial risk—is 
smoking a pack of cigarettes a day substantial risk of bodily harm? What 
constitutes recent behavior—in the past week, month, year, or lifetime? 
Does mental harm qualify as bodily harm? How current must a current 
intent be, and does a person have to act to carry out that intent? 
Defining “likely to cause harm” more clearly would answer most of 
these concerns and make it easier for courts to make clear and confident 
decisions about whether a mentally ill individual should be committed. 
Giving individuals the right to require the State to present more 
than one expert witness at their hearings would help prevent wrongful 
commitments, especially in cases where it is debatable whether the 
individual’s commitment is necessary. In E.P.’s case, only one doctor 
testified to his dangerousness.218 Because studies have shown that 
psychologists’ predictions of dangerousness are unreliable,219 providing 
 
 214. See § 47.30.730. 
 215. E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1110 (Alaska 2009) (using 
section 47.30.915 of the Alaska Statutes). 
 216. See E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 217. ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.915(10) (2010). 
 218. See id. at 1105. 
 219. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant’s future 
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“layers of professional review and observation of the patient’s 
condition,” as the Supreme Court suggested,220 would help make 
commitments more consistent. It seems clear in the preamble221 to the 
Alaska civil commitment statutes that the Legislature intended for an 
individual who is a danger to himself to be committed only when the 
State can show that the individual will likely improve with treatment. 
However, the court was forced to rely on its own interpretation of the 
statute because this element was not expressly included in the 
substantive commitment statutes.222 The Alaska Legislature should 
specify within the commitment statutes whether a showing of probable 
improvement is required for individuals who are shown to be a danger 
to themselves. This small action would have made E.P.’s commitment 
impossible because API repeatedly stated that E.P. would not improve 
at its facility.223 
E.P. needed substance abuse treatment but was locked in API 
because the State believed it was necessary to restrict his access to 
inhalants, even though API does not provide any substance abuse 
treatment.224 The record mentions that E.P. had tried an outpatient 
treatment center but “got bored” and left.225 This indicates that perhaps 
the available treatment centers were not adequate for his needs. The 
Legislature has already expressed interest in funding more community 
programs.226 The realization of these goals would provide efficient 
alternatives to the restrictive environment of API for people like E.P. 
who need treatment but do not need to be in a locked facility. 
CONCLUSION 
In E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute,227 the State did not want E.P. on 
the streets because he was likely to continue to huff. It found a loophole 
in the civil commitment statutes that allowed it to commit E.P. to API. 
 
dangerousness is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two 
times out of three.”); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (noting the 
“fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis”); Browne & Harrison-Spoerl, supra note 141, 
at 1175; Otto, supra note 145, at 47; cf. Buchanan, supra note 146, at 184, 188 
(stating that psychiatrists and psychologists can predict violence but that many 
nonviolent patients would have to be detained to prevent one violent act). 
 220. Addington, 441 U.S. at 428–29. 
 221.  § 47.30.655 
 222. See § 47.30.730; E.P., 205 P.3d at 1108. 
 223. See E.P., 205 P.3d at 1104. 
 224. See id. 
 225. Brief of Appellant, supra note 40, at 2. 
 226. See S.B. 48, 27th Leg. (Alaska 2011), available at http:// 
www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill_text.asp?hsid=SB0048A&session=27. 
 227. 205 P.3d 1101. 
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The State committed E.P. by claiming that he was a danger to himself 
when the more likely theory was that he was gravely disabled. But E.P. 
had to be committed under the theory that he was a danger to himself or 
he could not have been committed at all because API was unable to 
show that E.P. would improve with treatment. The commitment forced a 
man to spend his last days in a locked facility, separated from his family 
and friends and deprived of treatment—the signs of a commitment that 
serves as a punishment, not as a source of treatment. 
Criminal commitments punish individuals; civil commitments 
should treat individuals. The State of Alaska has taken substantial steps 
in the last decade to recognize this distinction through its civil 
commitment statutes228 and the three civil commitment cases that 
preceded E.P.’s case.229 However, the wrongful commitment of E.P. 
shows why the Alaska civil commitment system still needs further 
improvement. The clarification of the civil commitment statutes and the 
creation of efficient halfway houses are concrete steps that can be taken 
to protect the rights of the mentally ill against wrongful commitments 
and to ensure that civil commitments serve their purpose of treating the 
mentally ill, not punishing them. 
 
 
 228. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.655 (2010) (“The purpose of the 1981 major 
revision of Alaska civil commitment statutes…is to more adequately protect the 
legal rights of persons suffering from mental illness.“). 
 229. See cases cited supra note 206. 
